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Ernie Brown checks his watch with annoyance. As the youngest and brightest sales
representative in his company, he's been sent to Telco Mfg. in Mexico City, to pitch
his company's newest line of equipment. He's been waiting mote than forty minutes
to meet with Javier Arroyo-one of Telco's most influential managers and also the
petson responsible for authorizing capital purchases at the Mexico City facility-to
free himself up from other appointments. Finally, Ernie is led back to Senor Arroyo's
office. The conversation begins with "small talk"-mostly questions about Ernie's
activities since arriving in Mexico City. Upon learning that Ernie had not seen any
of the local sights, Senor Arroyo offers to take him sightseeing latet that afternoon.
Ernie responds with a polite, yet firm rejection, adding that this is a business trip
and that his boss expects him back in Los Angeles the following day. Senor Arroyo
continues to talk about famous buildings in Mexico City and the history ofthe archi
tecture. Exaspetated at the slow pace, Ernie interrupts him, asking for a tour of the
plant so that he can get a better sense of how the new equipment might fit in and
indicating his strong desire to discuss the new line he's touting. Senor Arroyo side
steps the request by asking about Ernie's family. But Ernie will not be put off and
insists on moving on to the reason for his visit. At this point, Senor Arroyo gives in
and begins to answer Ernie's questions. Later, while touring the plant facilities,
Ernie's cell phone rings. He answers it, and as he talks he notices Senor Arroyo's irri
tation. Ernie terminates the call, saying, "I'll get back to you on that tomorrow; my
host is giving me the evil eye." Back in Senor Arroyo's office, Ernie pulls out his lap
top and presentation materials. "Now, I'd like to show you something. This is our
new line of equipment. I've got some data on its performance characteristics in a
plant setting like yours. Let's take a look."
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Negotiating a deal can be rough sailing in one's own country. Negotiators, such
as Ernie in the opening vignette, often sail uncharted waters when negotiating
cross-culturally. Cultural factors can complicate, prolong, and frustrate negotia
tions; and finding accurate, useful information can be a challenge. Much of the
information that is available to an expanding corps of international managers
l
about negotiating behaviors in countries around the world is descriptive. Nego
2
tiators may find themselves relying on very basic lists of do and don'ts, which
may not always contain tips relevant to negotiating. Moreover, items included
in such lists are generally not comparable across countries. Empirical work that
systematically compares variations across a range of countries is scarce. 3 An exam
ple of the types of common information available to a negotiator for Mexico is
presented in Table 10.1. What the table makes clear is the lack of information
on many dimensions, the stereotypical nature ofwhat is available, and the contra
dictions that exist-without explanation-between widely available sources. In
this era of increased global cooperation, it is imperative that negotiators be
equipped with a better understanding of the orientations they might expect at
the negotiation table. 4
A comprehensive framework having potential to yield comparable information
across countries on 12 negotiating tendencies was proposed 20 years ago by
Stephen E. Weiss and William Stripp.5 The framework was conceptual, with
loosely defined dimensions. The intent was simply to sensitize researchers and
practitioners to possible culturally based differences in negotiation attitudes,
behaviors, and contexts. 6 To use the framework in empirical work it was necessary
to define each dimension more precisely, which led us to review the extensive
bodies of negotiation and cross-cultural research that have built up over the last
two decades. Based on our review, we redefined 9 of the original 12 dimensions.
Figure 10.1 comprises our reinterpretation of the framework.

s

THE NEGOTIATION ORIENTATIONS FRAMEWORK:
DEFINING THE DIMENSIONS
Refinements in the definition of the 12 dimensions in the framework are pre
sented below. Precise definitions provide the basis of good measurement and the
means by which subsequent research findings can be compared and synthesized?

Basic Concept of Negotiation: Distributive versus Integrative
Basic Concept of Negotiation refers to how each party views the negotiating
process. A bipolar continuum, with distributive bargaining and integrative
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Table 10.1
Conventional Wisdom about Negotiation in Mexico and the United States
Dimension

Mexico

United States

Basic Concept of
Negotiation:
Distributive or
Integrative

Mexicans have a win-win
attitude. Hard bargainers.
Long, vigorous discussions.

Problem solving. Look for
mutual gains, whenever
possible.

Most Significant Type
of Issue: Task or
Relationship

Mexicans are relationship
oriented.

Establish rapport quickly
before "getting down to
business." Personal
relationships are ignored
when discussing issues.

Selection of
Negotiators: Abilities or
Status

Expertise is less important
than fitting in with the
group.

Negotiators have relevant
skills and expertise.

Influence of Individual
Aspirations:
Individualist or
Collectivist

Mexicans pursue individual
goals, personal recognition.
Interests of the group are a
dominant factor.

Self-interested negotiators.

Internal DecisionMaking Process: Inde
pendent or Majority
Rule

DeciSion-making authority
is vested in a few at the top.
Mexicans prefer consensus.

Independent problem
solvers.

Orientation toward
Time: Monochronie or
Polychronie

Do not expect punctuality.
Easy-going business atmos
phere. Quick decisions
perceived as concessions.
Mexicans take time to reach
decisions.

Meetings begin and end
promptly. Agenda driven.
Action oriented. Decisions
are reached by the end of
the meeting.

Risk-Taking Propen
Mexican negotiators avoid
sity: Risk Averse or Risk risk.
Tolerant

Short-term oriented; focus
on immediate gains.

Basis of Trust: External
or Internal

Trust based on personal
relationships.

Heavy reliance on the
legal system. Lawyers
involved from start to
finish.

Concern with Protocol:
Formal or Informal

Mexicans value formality;
follow established etiquette.

Do not like formality in
business interaction.

StyleofConununica
tion: Low Context or
High Context

Mexicans avoid direct
answers.

Direct and

to

the point.

(continued)
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Table 10.1 (continued)
Dimension

Mexico

United States

Nature of Persuasion:
Factual-Inductive or
Affective

Truth is based on feelings.
Emotional arguments are
more effective than logic.

Deals are evaluated on
their technical merits.

Form ofAgreement:
Explicit Contract or
Implicit Agreement

W oreis are not a binding
commitment to action.
Relationships ensure followthrough.

Contracts are emphasized,
along with the fine points
of an agreement.

Sources: Recommendations are drawn from a variety of sources including Business Mexico, 2002; Cul
rureGrams World Edition 2007; Elashmawi, 2001; Fisher & Uty, 1991; Hall & Hall, 1990; Hampden
Turner & Trompenaars, 2000; Investor's Business Daily, 2004; Kras, 1989; Moran & Stripp, 1991; and
Morrison, Conaway, & Borden, 1994.

problem solving as endpoints, is consistent with R.E. Walton and Robert B.
McKersie. 8

Distributive Perspective
The assumption underlying distributive bargaining strategies is that one party
gains at the expense of the other. Negotiators fitting this profile believe that there
will be one winner and one loser,9 assume that their interests directly conflict with
those of the other party, 10 seek to meet only their own goals or interests in order
to maximize the benefit for their side, 11 and focus on the need for the other party
12
to concede. The prevailing belief is "what is good for the other party must be
bad for us.,,13

Integrative Perspective
The assumption underlying integrative bargaining strategies is that there is
opportunity for both parties to gain from a negotiated agreement because they
place different values on the issues being negotiated and can find effective trade
offs by conceding less important issues to gain on more important ones. Integra
tive negotiation involves both cooperation to expand the pie and competition to
divide the pie between the two parties. 14 Negotiators fitting this profile believe
that win-win solutions can be generated,15 employ a problem-solving approach
to develop solutions that expand the size of the rewards available to everyone, 16
and attempt to understand the underlying issues and their relative importance
to both parties in order to capitalize on the different interests of both parties
and to find effective trade-offs. 17
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Figure 10.1
The Negotiation Orientations Framework

Dimensions

1. Basic Concept of Negotiation

Negotiator's Profile
..

Integrative
_Distributive
_ _.-._._._._ - - _ -._._._._._ ... _ -... _... _-- -""'- .. -.- ... -
...

...

....

...

...

...

...

....

2. Most Significant Type of
Issue

Task

Relationship

3. Selection of Negotiators

Abilities

Status

4. Influence of Individual
Aspirations

Individualist

Collectivist

5. Internal Decision-Making
Process

Independent

Majority Rule

6. Orientation toward Time

...

Monochronic
Polychronic
._-_
.. _---_ .. _._ _.-._ .. _.. _ _._------.,._ _.,_ .. ------_ .. _.. _""---
...

...

....

7. Risk-Taking Propensity

Risk-averse

Risk-tolerant

8. Basis of Trust

External to the
Parties

Internal to the Parties

9. Concern with Protocol

Fonna!

Infonnal

Low-context

High-context

11. Nature of Persuasion

Factual-inductive

Affective

12. Fonn of Agreement

Explicit

Implicit

10. Style of Communication

---------_._---------------------- ... ----_ .. ---------------'"

Most Significant Type of Issue: Task versus Relationship
Most Significant Type of Issue refers to the types of issues negotiators spend
more time discussing. Although negotiators may be concerned with both task
and relationship in a negotiation, they are likely to emphasize one over the
other. IS

Task
Negotiators with a task frame focus on specific issues having to do with the
project at hand and view these issues as being external to the relationship. 19 Nego
tiators who believe that task issues are more important tend to focus the entire
negotiation on the deal being discussed and not so much on the people involved
in the discussions. 2o

Relationship
Negotiators with a relationship frame view task-related issues as being insepa
rable from the relationship. They devote time to activities that build trust and
friendship between the members, believing that this provides a foundation for
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addressing task issues?! Negotiators who believe that the relationship is primary
tend to focus the entire negotiation on the people involved in the discussions
and not so much on the deal being discussed. 22

Selection of Negotiators: Abilities versus Status
Selection of Negotiators refers to the criteria used to select members of the
negotiating team. Achievement-based people evaluate and relate to others based
on what they have accomplished; status-based people evaluate and relate to others
23
based on who they are.

Abilities
People with an achievement-based view believe members of a negotiating team
should be selected because they possess certain job-related skills or because they
24
have expertise that will be useful during the course of the negotiations. Exam
ples of relevant skills or expertise include education, technical or scientific knowl
edge, legal training, vocational achievement, negotiating experience, or language
fluency.

Status
People with a status-based view believe members of a negotiating team should
be selected because of who they are and whom they know. Examples of relevant
characteristics include family background, influential connections, seniority, age,
or gender. 25 Negotiators from status-based cultures may be senior, high-ranking
26
officials, who wield considerable influence in their organizations and who may
also command great respect in the community at large. 27

Influence of Individual Aspirations: Individualist versus Collectivist
Influence of Individual Aspirations refers to the emphasis negotiators plac~ on
the achievement of individual goals and the need for individual recognition.

Individualist
Harry C. Triandis defines individualists as people who see themselves as loosely
linked to and independent of others. 28 They are motivated primarily by their own
preferences, needs, and rights, atld they give priority to their personal goals. From
this, we can describe individualist negotiators as being emotionally independent
from the organization to which they belong and as striving to achieve outcomes
that are in their own best interests. They may also keep the organization's interests
and goals in mind, but will do so because they expect personal reward atld recog
nition for their decisions. 29
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Collectivist
Triandis defines collectivists as people who see themselves as closely linked to
and pans of groups of co-workers or a company, for example. 3D They give priority
to the goals of the collective. From this, we can describe collectivist negotiators as
strongly identifying with and being loyal to their organizations; consequently,
they may strive to achieve outcomes that are in the organization's best interest
and may do so with no expectation of personal recognition or gain. The negotiat
ing team may assume joint responsibility and/or receive joint recognition for
actions taken or decisions made. 31
Internal Decision-Making Process: Independent versus Majority Rule
Internal Decision-Making Process refers to the manner in which a negotiating
team reaches decisions. Jeanne M. Brett identifies a range of decision-making
behaviors, where either one person on the team has the authority to make the
decision or a large proportion of the team's members must agree to a particular
decision. 32
Independent
Leaders or other influential individuals on the negotiating team may make deci
sions independently without input from others on the team. 33
Majority Rule
Decision-making power is delegated to the entire team. The team leader seeks
input and support from team members and listens to their advice.
Orientation toward Time: Monochronic versus Polychronic
Orientation toward Time refers to the value that negotiators place on time.
Edward T. Hall and Mildred Reed Hall defined two culturally derived concepts
of time that are important to international business. 34
Monochronic
People whose orientation toward time is monochronic pay attention to and
handle tasks one at a time, plan and schedule their activities, and set agendas
and adhere to them. Monochronic negotiators believe that issues in a negotiation
should be resolved effectively within the allotted time frame. They believe that
time is money.35
Polychronic
People whose orientation toward time is polychronic handle several tasks
simultaneously rather than in scheduled succession. Polychronic people do not
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expect human activities to proceed like clockwork. Consequently, scheduling is
approximate rather than specific, and delays do not have the negative associations
found in monochronic cultures. Negotiators from polychronic cultures believe
that taking the time to get to know their counterparts and building a relationship
is more important than adhering to a schedule, The actual clock time spent dis
36
cussing and resolving issues is of minor importance.
Risk-Taking Propensity: Risk Averse versus Risk Tolerant
This dimension refers to negotiators' willingness to take risks.

Risk Averse
Risk-averse negotiators are hesitant to proceed with proposals that may have
unknowns andlor contingencies associated with them. 37 Risk-averse negotiators
will take steps to avoid the risk of failing to come to an agreement. 38 Conse
quently, they may be more likely to make concessions in order to avoid the risk
o f I:raJ'I'mg to come to an agreement. 39

Risk Tolerant
Risk-tolerant negotiators adopt a perspective that there is a level of acceptable
risk that should be taken in a negotiation. They are interested in reducing risk,
rather than avoiding it altogether. Risk-tolerant negotiators are willing to proceed
with proposals that may have unknowns andlor contingencies associated with
them. 40 Risk-tolerant negotiators show greater willingness to run the risk of fail
ing to come to an agreement. 41 They accept the possibility that they may need
to walk away from the table without a deal; hence, they are less likely to make
,
42
concessIOns.
Basis of Trust: External to the Parties versus Internal to the Relationship
Trust is one party's belief that the other party will take action to honor agree
ments that have been reached. 43 In all countries, trust provides the foundation
upon which both parties to a negotiation can work together; however, negotiators
from some countries trust that the other party will fulfill its obligations because
there is a signed contract and the sanction of law to back it up, while negotiators
from other countries trust that the other party will fulfill its obligations because of
the relationship that exists between them.

External to the Parties
Negotiators with this viewpoint trust the other party because a contract has
been negotiated and agreed to, which can be litigated and enforced. 44 The legal
system and governmental agencies are viewed as providing an adequate, reliable,
and effective underpinning for commercial transactions. A partner will honor
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the terms of the contract because the legal system will impose sanctions otherwise.
The written word is binding; a deal is a deal. 45 In this context, a trustworthy part
ner is one who complies with the law.

Internal to the Relationship
Negotiators with this frame trust the other party because they have invested in a
relationship that has been built up over time, and they believe that the other party
is committed to it. The relationship between the parties is what matters; the con
tract is simply a symbol of the bond between the parties who drafted it. 46 A trust
worthy partner is one who strives to maintain the relationship, possibly by
modifYing an existing contract to reflect new developments. 47
Concern with Protocol: Formal versus Informal
Concern with Protocol has to do with the importance placed on rules for
acce.ratable self-presentation and social behavior. It corresponds to Pertti]. Pel
to'S 8 characterization of tight and loose cultures, which we use to define the
dimension more fully.

Ponnal
Negotiators with a high concern for protocol will adhere to strict and detailed
rules that govern personal and professional conduct, negotiating procedures, as
well as the hospitality extended to negotiators from the other side. Rules gov
erning acceptable behavior might include dress codes, use of titles, and seating
arrangements. 49 Negotiators believe that there is a limited range of appropriate
behaviors, and there is strong agreement on the team about what constitutes cor
rect action.

Infonnal
Negotiators with a relatively low concern for protocol adhere to a much
smaller, more loosely defined set of rules. Team members may believe there are
multiple ways to behave appropriately in a particular situation and may even have
conflicting ideas about what is appropriate.
Style of Communication: High Context versus Low Context
This dimension refers to the degree to which people rely on verbal statements
to communicate their primary message. Two culturally derived styles of commu
nication are important to international business. 50

Low Context
Low-context communicators believe that clarity is critical for effective commu
nication, and they perceive direct requests to be the most effective strategy for
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accomplishing their goalS. 51 The onus is on the communicator to make sure that
the other party understands what is being said. 52 Low-context communicators are
less likely to pick up on hints, particularly if the parties do not know each other
well. Frank, open communication is perceived as the best way to resolve differ
ences. 53 It is possible to offer criticism without having the other person take
offense.
High Context
High-context communicators perceive direct requests to be the least effective
strategy for accomplishing their goals. Directness is often considered rude and
offensive; hence high-context communicators tend to be tactful, use qualifying
words, and listen carefully. High-context communicators often hide their true
feelings in order to maintain harmony in a relationship. 54 It is very difficult to
offer criticism without having the other person take offense. 55 Importantly, peo
ple cannot be separated from the message, which means that reaching agreement
with someone is completely dependent on liking that person.

Nature of Persuasion: Factual-Inductive versus Affective
This dimension refers to the type of evidence negotiators use to develop persua
sive arguments. After an extensive review of the literature on philosophy, culture,
and argumentation, we synthesized the variety of persuasive arguments in a bipo
lar dimension, with factual-inductive and affective as endpoints.
Factual-Inductive
Factual-inductive negotiators base their arguments on emfirical facts and use
linear logic (if-then statements) to persuade the other party. 5 Proof used to sup
port persuasive arguments includes such things as scientific evidence, professional
standards, expert opinion, costs, market value, and other hard data. 57 Moreover,
factual-inductive negotiators believe the strongest case is made by presenting their
best arguments nrst.
Affective
Affective negotiators may base their arguments on abstract theory, ideals,58
references to status and relationships, and/or appeals to sympathy. 59 Evidence
used to support persuasive arguments includes such things as moral standards,
equal treatment, tradition, and reciprocity.60 Affective negotiators develop their
arguments indirectly. They may start with peripheral arguments and present their
best arguments last, after the other party has reacted. 61
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Form of Agreement: Explicit Contract versus Implicit Agreement

This dimension refers to the preferred form of agreement between the parties:
either formal written contracts or informal oral agreements. Formal written con
tracts clearly specify desired partner actions, the degree to which both panies of
the agreement will cooperate and conform to each other's expectations, as well
as the penalties that one party can extract should the other party fail to perform.
Informal agreements often consider the historical and social context of a relation
ship and acknowledge that the performance and enforcement of obligations are an
outcome of mutual interest between panies. 62

Explicit Contract
Negotiators with this frame favor and expect written, legally binding con
tracts. 63 A written contract records the agreement and definitively specifies what
64
each party has agreed to do. Consequently, negotiators believe that written
agreements provide the stability that allows their organization to make invest
ments and minimize the risk of business 10ss.65

Implicit Agreement
Negotiators with this viewpoint favor broad or vague language in a contract
because they feel that definitive contract terms are too rigid to allow a good work
ing relationship to evolve. Particularly with new relationships, negotiators may
feel that it is impossible to anticipate and document every conceivable contin
gency. They may also believe that contracts inhibit the parties from exploring
unexpected or unusual opportunities for improvement and success. Negotiators
view the contract as a rough guideline, not because they want to evade responsibil
ity, but because the relationship, not the contract, is primary. 66

USING THE FRAMEWORK IN RESEARCH AND PRACTICE
N ow we return to our opening vignette and consider how the Negotiation Ori
entations Framework can help us understand the difficulties that Mr. Brown and
Senor Arroyo are having. Even before the panies enter into discussions, the Selec
tion of Negotiators emerges as an important factor in understanding possible ten
sions in their discussion. Sefior Arroyo has been selected because of his influence
in the company (status), while Mr. Brown has been chosen because of his proven
performance (ability). Mr. Brown arrives punctually for the meeting and becomes
impatient at having to wait (monochronic Orientation toward Time); meanwhile
Senor Arroyo seems unconcerned with the delay (polychronic). Once Mr. Brown
finally gets a chance to speak with Senor Arroyo, he finds that the conversation
focuses on nonbusiness matters. For Sefior Arroyo the Most Significant Type of
Issue to be addressed is whether or not the two panies can develop a good relation
ship-something he signals by seeking to get to know Mr. Brown on a more

186

New World Marketing

personal level. In contrast, Mr. Brown focuses on the task, that is, the details of
the negotiation. The two also have different orientations regarding Style of Com
munication, with Mr. Brown talking directly and somewhat informally (low con
text) while Senor Arroyo adopts a more circumspect and subtle approach (high
context).
Within the space of just a few hours, tension points along 4 of the
12 dimensions have already been identified. It is likely that more will surface as
the two proceed more deeply into the negotiation process. Whether these tension
points become minor irritants or major stumbling blocks will depend on several
factors, including the desire of both negotiators to achieve an agreement, the skill
of both negotiators at reducing, rather than amplifying tensions, and the ability of
both negotiators to discriminate between differences in negotiating positions and
differences in negotiation orientations. The Negotiation Orientations Framework
is a useful tool in helping negotiators identify tension points that may arise as a
consequence of cultural differences in orientations.

Linking Hofstede's Dimensions of National Culture to Negotiation
Orientations
What accounts for these differences in negotiation tendencies? One of the most
widely explored explanations is culture; differences in cultural values lead to dif
ferent negotiating orientations. 67 Geert Hofstede identified four work-related
dimensions of national culture that have been used extensively in cross-cultural
research, training, and management: Power Distance, Uncertainty Avoidance,
Individualism-Collectivism, and Masculinity-Femininity. While research sup
porting the validity of Hofstede's dimensions is extensive, surprisingly few of
these studies link them to negotiating orientations. The notion that cultural val
ues may explain differences in negotiating tendencies led us to explore linkages
between Hofstede's dimensions and the negotiation orientations in the Weiss
and Srripp framework. 68 First, we reviewed the research relating Hofstede's
dimensions to negotiating behaviors and developed hypotheses (Table 10.2)
based on this review. Next, we conducted a systematic review of prior work on
the negotiating tendencies found in Brazil, China, Germany, Japan, Mexico,
and the United States and identified the "typical" orientation of negotiators from
each country on each of the 12 dimensions in the Negotiation Orientations
Framework. As an example, prior work indicates that U.S. and German negotia
tors would be selected on the basis of their abilities and that status considerations
would figure in more heavily in Brazil, Mexico, China, and Japan. Then, we
developed an ordered ranking of the countries on each negotiating dimension
and correlated those rankings with country rankings on Hofstede's dimensions.
Our analysis showed strong correlations for countries with high UAI scores and
a majority-rule orientation on the Internal Decision Making Process, as well as
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Table 10.2
Hypotheses Linking Hofstede's Dimensions of National Culture to Negotiation
Orientations
Negotiation Orientation

Hofstede Dimension

Support for Hypothesis

1. Basic Concept of Negotiation

MAS *

None

2. Most Significant Type of Issue

IDV

Moderate

3. Selection of Negotiators

PDI

None

4. Influence of Individual Aspirations

IDV

Moderate

5. Internal Decision-Making Process

UAl

Strong

6. Orientation toward Time

UAl

Strong

7. Risk-Taking Propensity

DAl

Moderate

8. Basis of Trust

UAl

Moderate

9. Concern with Protocol

UAl

Moderate

10. Style of Communication

IDV

Strong

11. Nature of Persuasion

UAl

Strong

12. Form of Agreement

UAl

Moderate

*MAS

=

Masculinity; IDV = Individualism; PDr = Power Distance Index; VAl = Uncertainty

Avoidance.

monochronic tendencies on Orientation toward Time. Low DAI scores were
strongly correlated with a factual-inductive orientation on Nature of Persuasion.
High scores on IDV were strongly correlated with a low-context Style ofCommu
nication. Results for the linkages between the other eight negotiation orientations
in the framework and Hofstede's cultural values were less clear (Table 10.2).
While theoretical links between cultural values and negotiation orientations can
be found, our findings suggest that researchers ought to be wary of making infer
ences about negotiating tendencies on the basis of work-related cultural values.
Even though managers from countries with high masculinity scores may be more
competitive,69 this does not necessarily translate to a distributive orientation on
the Basic Concept of Negotiation.
Although it may be reasonable to expect a connection between negotiation and
culture, it is clear from the extensive body of empirical research that national cul
ture does not account in whole, or even in large part, for differences in negotiation
orientations. A number of models have been proposed that (1) attempt to capture
the myriad influences on international negotiating behavior and (2) permit com
parisons between countries on a set of dimensions. 7o These models focus on what
individuals do and how culture influences negotiating behavior.?! When sup
ported by empirical findings, the use of a dimensional framework or model
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enables meaningful cross-national comparison. Such comparisons are useful to
negotiators; possible areas of tension can be systematically identified and adjust
ments in expectations and negotiation behaviors can be made, which increases
the likelihood of positive outcomes. 72 The Salacuse framework, which includes
ten negotiating tendencies, is the only one of these models that has been empiri
cally investigated in full.

The Salacuse Framework: An Alternative Approach that Supports the
Negotiation Orientations Framework
To measure the ten negotiating tendencies in his framework, Jeswald W.
Salacuse developed a survey instrument, which included his ten bipolar dimen
sions, measured on five-point scales. Respondents were instructed to indicate
where their own negotiating style and approach in business negotiations fell along
each of the ten continua. In his 1998 study, Salacuse reported results from a sur
vey of 191 respondents from 12 countries, finding that nationality did account
for differences in negotiating tendencies. 73
In a five-country study, which included nearly 1,200 business people and uni
versity students with business experience from Finland, India, Mexico, Turkey,
and the United States, we confirmed the utility of the Salacuse framework
(Figure 10.2) in identifying country differences in negotiating tendencies?4 Spe
cific country differences in mean scores were identified using pair-wise tests. For
Figure 10.2
Salacwe Dimensions of Cultural Variation in Negotiation

Negotiation Factors Range of Cultural Responses
1. Goal

Contract

2. Attitudes

WinlLose

•

~

III

~

•

~

Relationship
WinlWin

3. Personal Styles

Informal

4. Communications

Direct

III

~

5. Time Sensitivity

High

III

~

6. Emotionalism

High

•

~

Low

7. Agreement Form

Specific

III

~

General

8. Agreement Building

Bottom Up

III

~

Top Down

9. Team Organization

One Leader

•

~

Consensus

10. Risk Taking

High

III

~

Low

Formal
Indirect
Low
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five of the dimensions-Goal, Attitudes, Personal Styles, Time Sensitivity, and
Agreement Building-we found significant differences in mean scores on seven
of the ten paired comparisons. In only one case-Agreement Form-did we £lnd
no significant differences in mean scores among the five countries. In addition to
reporting n1ean scores, we looked at the dispersion of responses (intracultural
variation) within each country. Intracultural variation (ICV), measured by the
standard deviation, can help capture critical cross-cultural differences. Our
results showed that ICV for India was consistently larger than the other four
countries across all ten negotiating tendencies, indicating that widely varying
tendencies on a given dimension can be found among individual negotiators
within India. In contrast, ICV for the United States was the smallest among the
five countries for seven of the ten negotiating tendencies, indicating relatively
consistent tendencies among individual U.S. negotiators on the majority of
dimensions. Although each country presented a unique pattern of negotiation ori
entations, not surprisingly, countries were found to be similar on some dimen
sions. For example, no significant differences were found between pairs of
countries on agreement form, despite the fact that ICV varied widely. In sum,
the findings from this study confirmed that cross-national variation in negotiation
tendencies could be identified using the Salacuse framework. Equally important,
if not more so, the findings revealed that individuals and groups within cultures
may be united on some dimensions, deeply divided or split on others, and
uncommitted on others..
While the Salacuse framework was effective in revealing the varied and complex
nature of negotiation tendencies between and within cultures for several dimen
sions, it was also useful in revealing tendencies that are contrary to conventional
wisdom with respect to typical negotiating behaviors in the countries studied.
For exan1ple, most sources indicate that Mexican and Indian negotiators do not
expect punctuality and tend to follow a slower pace; Turkish negotiators are punc
tual, yet also follow a slower pace; and "time is money" for U.S. negotiators.7 5 Yet
respondents from Finland, India, Mexico, and Turkey reported a higher sensitiv
ity toward time than U.S. respondents. Similarly, based on conventional wisdom,
one would expect Turkish, Indian, and Mexican negotiators to show a tendency
to communicate indirectly and to prefer relationships over contract. This was
not the case. Conventional wisdom also did not hold for emotionalism, with
Finnish and U.S. respondents preferring neither to act emotionally nor to keep
their emotions under wraps. These findings suggest that negotiators should be
wary of conventional thinking and prepare differently than "conventional
wisdom" might suggest.
Despite the utility of the Salacuse framework, several of the dimensions in the
framework are not clearly defined. For example, in his discussion of time sensitiv
ity, Salacuse76 refers to two different concepts: whether negotiators from a given
country are punctual or late and whether negotiators are quick to make a deal or
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proceed slowly. To the extent that these are conceptually separable, they should
be treated as such. The 12 dimensions in the Negotiation Orientations Frame
work are consistent with the Salacuse dimensions and offer improvements in
conceptualization.

The Negotiation Orientations Framework: Not 12 but 24 Dimensions

With the dimensions of the Negotiation Orientations Framework defined in
terms of extant bodies of research, we sought to develop measurement scales that
could be used to assess tendencies in negotiating behaviors across countries and to
gather data that would allow comparisons between countries. Descriptions of the
behaviors exemplifying each pole of each dimension in the Negotiation Orienta
tions Framework were converted to statements, yielding 71 items, which were
scored on a five-point Likert scale, with endpoints "strongly agree" and "strongly
disagree." The resulting Negotiation Orientations Inventory was administered to
a sample of 1,000 business persons and universiry students with business experi
ence from Finland, Mexico, Turkey, and the United States. The majority of our
measures simply did not work as intended. In developing items, we followed the
literature and carefully included items that reflected both poles of each dimension.
The assumption was that we could reverse code items representing the opposing
end of a given pole and include them in a scale. Doing so resulted in reliabilities
well below the criterion we had set. This led us to examine the possibiliry that,
while the Negotiation Orientations Framework suggested that the ends of a
dimension (for example, explicit contract versus implicit agreement) could be
viewed as polar opposites, in practice, people may not think of them as such
(for example, explicitness and implicitness are independent constructs). Similar
to the results of individual-level research about individualism and collectivism,77
most constructs that the negotiation literature treats as bipolar appear to be better
understood as distinct dimensions. Consequently, we began to think in terms of
24 negotiating tendencies, rather than 12 dimensions each with two poles, and
we redefined our indicators and scales accordingly.
We used the resulting scales and also several single-item indicators to look at
differences in negotiation orientations across the four countries on the dimensions
in the Negotiation Orientations Framework. 78 We did, indeed, find significant
differences in negotiating orientations for Finland, Mexico, Turkey, and the
United States. Moreover, the results revealed that constructs frequently presented
as bipolar may not be. Rather than demonstrating an orientation toward one pole
of a continuum to the exclusion of the other, respondents from all four countries
were often oriented toward both. Similar to our work with the Salacuse dimen
sions, we found significantly different patterns of response for all four countries
on most negotiating tendencies. And, once again, we found surprising results on
a number of dimensions, given the orientations commonly cited in negotiation
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guides,79 providing additional evidence that conventional wisdom on negotiating
tendencies may be misleading.

CONCLUSION
Cultural differences can complicate, prolong, and even frustrate international
negotiations. In an ideal world, skilled negotiators would come to the table with
deep knowledge and familiarity with the culture and negotiation orientations of
their counterparts; however, the pace and pressures of global business make this
highly unlikely. Consequently, a framework that focuses on key dimensions of
the international negotiation context and process can serve as a valuable tool in
assisting negotiators and researchers alike in identifying potential points of con
flict. The Negotiation Orientations Framework provides perhaps the most com
prehensive approach to date for systematic comparison of national cultural
differences in negotiations.
Our empirical analyses point to several important conclusions and implica
tions. First, the results of our work connrm that a dimensional framework is use
ful for identifying meaningful cross-national comparison. Negotiators can use the
dimensions in a framework to systematically identify possible areas of tension,
thereby making it possible to appropriately adjust their expectations and negotia
tion practices accordingly.
Second, our work demonstrates that, while cultural values may account for
some differences in negotiation orientations, it does not wholly account for the
observed differences between negotiators from different countries. As Weiss
notes, just as multiple values are most likely to determine behavior, multiple
behaviors are likely to result from one value. 80 Our nndings suggest that negotia
tors ought to be wary of making inferences about negotiating tendencies on the
basis of cultural values alone, because measurements of cultural values are often
too general and not sufficiently context specinc.
Third, our experience with designing measures for the Negotiation Orienta
tions Framework reveals that constructs frequently presented as polar opposites
should be treated as separate dimensions. Researchers need to think in terms of
24 separate constructs rather than 12 bipolar dimensions. This suggests a very dif
ferent approach to measure design than we had anticipated. It also suggests that
understanding intercultural negotiation is considerably more complex than is
appreciated in the current intercultural negotiation literature. Thinking in terms
of24 separate constructs rather than 12 bipolar dimensions also has equally inter
esting implications for negotiators. Taking Basis of Trust as an example, negotia
tors should realize that the goals of a signed contract and of building a relationship
are not necessarily mutually exclusive and that the achievement of one can lead to
the other. Moreover, a negotiator who becomes aware of being personally ori
ented toward both contracts and relationships develops a more nne-grained
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appreciation of self-awareness, as well as an appreciation that the party across the
table may hold a similarly complex perspective.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, although information on country
specific negotiating styles may be available, international negotiators ought to
question conventional wisdom about negotiation stereotypes. Simply stated, con
ventional wisdom may not be accurate. Again, using Basis of Trust as an example,
it is no longer accurate or useful-if it ever was-for a U.S. negotiator to expect a
Mexican counterpart to be solely relationship oriented or a U.S. compatriot to be
solely contract oriented.
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